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P.F. Strawson proposed in the early seventies a threefold distinction regard-
ing how context bears on the meaning of ‘what is said’ when a sentence is ut-
tered. The proposal was somewhat tentative and, being aware of this aspect, 
Strawson himself raised various questions to make it more adequate. In this 
paper, we review Strawson’s scheme, note his concerns, and add some of our 
own. We also defend its essence and recommend it as an insightful entry 
point re the interplay of intended meaning and context.
Keywords: context, disambiguation, illocutionary force, indexical, literary 
theory, meaning, reference, translation, ‘what is said’
Being endless, the burden of context is too difficult to bear. It is the sort 
of burden with which one should learn to live intelligently rather than 
expect to think away.
Ben-Ami Scharfstein (1989:185)
. Introduction
In human communication using natural language, there is potential for a cer-
tain intricacy regarding the communicative mode and ‘what is said’ (Ziff 1972). 
The following anecdote comes from Johnson-Laird (1990: 7):
Once upon a time Stalin read out in public a telegram from Trotsky: ‘You 
were right and I was wrong. You are the true heir of Lenin. I should apologize. 
Trotsky’. According to Leo Rosten, a Jewish tailor then stepped from the crowd 
and explained to Stalin how he ought to have read the message: You were right 
and I was wrong? You are the true heir of Lenin? I should apologize???!!
While one appreciates the crucial role of intonation in this story, most of us 
also realize that it is the historical background through which the intended 
meaning is contextually determined in this case. Thus, Stalin’s rendering of the 






























individual words or phrases does make sense but it is the deconstructive read-
ing of the tailor that shows the actual meaning of Trotsky’s message.
Few would deny that in the process of construing meaning, one is caught 
in the act of contextualizing — placing things in context (Goodwin and Du-
ranti 1992; Dascal 2004b).1 In studying this act in any detail, it is unavoidable 
to notice the interaction of authorial intentions and context. Just consider the 
confusion that results from a lack of contextual information when, for exam-
ple, you join a scheduled meeting half an hour late. Without the clues of the 
original context, you might find it hard to make sense of the ongoing discus-
sion. In any case, the discussants would realise this and try to give you a quick 
rundown of the conversations so far. This is essentially the view of Clark and 
Carlson (1981) who regard context as information that is available to a person 
for interaction with a particular process on a given occasion. Their ‘intrinsic 
context’ is an attempt to capture the information available to a process that is 
potentially necessary for it to succeed. The intrinsic context for grasping what 
a speaker means on some occasion is the (limited) totality of the knowledge, 
beliefs, and suppositions that are shared by the speaker and the listener (also 
known as the ‘common ground’). But, how does one really purport to know 
the intended meaning of a given message? It turns out that in his most recent 
volume of essays, Strawson expresses some views on this very question.
Strawson’s book is entitled Entity and Identity, and the essays which treat 
the afore-mentioned question at some length appear as Chapters 11 and 12 
(Strawson 1997a, 1997b). In these essays,2 Strawson advances a threefold dis-
tinction regarding how context bears on the meaning of ‘what is said’ when 
a sentence is uttered (Ziff 1972). In his view, three senses (sense-A-meaning, 
sense-B-meaning, and sense-C-meaning) capture increasingly more intricate 
and progressively richer aspects of what is said. But Strawson cautions that 
his proposed scheme may still be simplistic, since the situation may be more 
complicated than the scheme suggests, and raises various points to make it 
more adequate.
In this paper, we’ll (i) review the original scheme of Strawson and sum-
marize his improvements to his own scheme, and (ii) add our own suggestions 
to make it even more thoroughgoing. Overall, we’ll defend the versatility of 
Strawson’s framework. We’ll also show that unless it is elaborated in several 
respects — mostly based on a viewpoint regarding context as a social construct 
(Akman 2000) and contextualizing as a form of social action (Fetzer and Ak-
man 2002) — it cannot function as a realistic initiative towards building com-
mon sense models of how intended meaning is conveyed.3
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2. Strawson’s scheme
Clark and Carlson (1981) state that context has become a favourite word. They 
then complain that the denotation of the word has become murkier as its uses 
have been extended in many directions, making context some sort of ‘concep-
tual garbage can’. Similar complaints can be sensed in some of the contributed 
chapters in Cole et al. (1997). In view of such grievances, Strawson’s approach is 
commendable. He tackles the riddle of how context influences intended mean-
ing by first proposing a simple question and an economic answer. He then at-
tends to the complications that seem not to be easily resolvable by the latter.
Assume that a certain sentence S of a language L (e.g., English) was seri-
ously uttered on some occasion. (The adverb “seriously” plays a crucial role, 
as we’ll later see.) Assume further that X, the hearer, possesses only that much 
information: X knows that S was uttered but knows nothing about the identity 
of Y, the speaker, or the nature or date of the occasion. (In various places in the 
sequel, this restriction will be relaxed.) Let us grant X full mastery of the syntax 
and semantics of L; thus, X is assumed to have ideally complete knowledge of L 
(lexicon plus grammar). The question is as follows (Strawson 1997a: 192):
 [I]s there any sense in which X can be said to know the meaning of precisely 
what was said on the occasion in question?
Strawson’s proposed scheme to analyse this problem consists in erecting three 
progressively richer senses of meaning, which he dubs sense-A-meaning, 
sense-B-meaning, and sense-C-meaning.
2. Sense-A-Meaning
Sense-A-meaning is linguistic meaning. Suppose S is free of ambiguity, or more 
realistically, X is informed which of the alternative readings of S is the right 
one, i.e., the one meant by Y. (It is beside the point, for the time being, how 
X could be told which of the possible lexical items or syntactic constructions 
Y actually had in mind in uttering S.) We then say that X knows the sense-A-
meaning of ‘what is said’.
An important characteristic of such meaning is that if he has access to it, 
then X can give a correct translation of S into another language L′ (e.g., French), 
which X, once again, is assumed to know perfectly well. In other words, when 
sense-A-meaning is under consideration, X knows neither more nor less than 
what he needs to know in order to translate S into a sentence S′ of L′.






























Consider the following sentence: “The collapse of the bank took every-
one by surprise”. The designation of the word “bank” varies with different uses. 
Nevertheless, once the intended designation is clarified, then the translation of 
S from L to L′ proceeds smoothly. Also witness Perry’s similar remarks (Perry 
1998: 2):
An ambiguous expression like ‘bank’ may designate one kind of thing when 
you say ‘Where’s a good bank?’ while worried about finances, another when I 
use it, thinking about fishing. […] Is the speaker holding a wad of money or 
a fishing pole?
To summarize the preceding paragraphs,
 sense-A-meaning ≈ S ⊕ A-knowledge ⊕ disambiguating knowledge,
where A-knowledge is the ideally complete knowledge of the lexicon and gram-
mar of L. In this mock equation, the interpretations of ≈ and ⊕ are somewhat 
procedural; that is, the equation states that sense-A-meaning is obtained (ap-
proximated, if you will) by just understanding S in the light of A-knowledge 
and disambiguating knowledge (and with a propensity toward accurate trans-
lation of S into any other, equally rich language).
2.2 Sense-B-Meaning
Strawson’s sense-B-meaning is linguistic-cum-referential meaning. X will learn 
the sense-B-meaning of S if he has access to the references of proper names or 
indexicals that may be contained in S.
An example might illustrate the difference between sense-A and sense-B 
meanings. If S is the sentence “He stood on his head since then”, and if X is fur-
ther told that this potentially ambiguous sentence has its natural reading when 
“his” is co-referential with “he”, then X can easily translate S to, say, French. 
When X does that accurately, it would show that X understood the sense-A-
meaning of S. Now suppose X has no idea whom “he” stands for and which 
time point “then” denotes. This might not pose a problem for the translation. 
But if X additionally learns the reference of “he” (say, J.L. Austin) and “then” 
(say, New Year’s Day, 1955) then X would know a richer meaning, the sense-B 
meaning of S. 
In a style suggested by the earlier equation,
 sense-B-meaning ≈ sense-A-meaning ⊕ B-knowledge,
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where B-knowledge includes — in addition to A-knowledge — the knowledge 
of the reference of proper names and indexical expressions in S. Again, this 
mock equation can be interpreted as follows: sense-B-meaning is obtained by 
scrutinizing sense-A-meaning in the light of B-knowledge.
2.3 Sense-C-Meaning
Finally, Strawson offers sense-C-meaning as the complete meaning of a mes-
sage. Sense-C-meaning is obtained by adding to sense-B-meaning the illocu-
tionary force (à la Austin) of what was said, together with a complete grasp of 
how what was said is intended (by Y) to be understood (by X). Thus,
 sense-C-meaning ≈ sense-B-meaning ⊕ C-knowledge,
where C-knowledge consists of — in addition to B-knowledge — the illocu-
tionary force of S plus the true intent of Y. For instance, if S is the sentence 
“Don’t sign that contract yet”, then X needs to know whether this was issued as 
a request, a command, a piece of advice, or what have you. This is the dimen-
sion of meaning Austin captured with the phrase ‘illocutionary force’.
There is a related but distinct notion: it may be that Y intends to be taken 
to be implying by S something that does not ensue from S’s sense-B-meaning 
alone. Assume that X and Y know (and know each other to know) that their 
mutual friend Z declined an honour conferred upon him by the church. When 
Y says “It is the sign of a feeble mind to turn down a gift from God”, the mean-
ing of what he said would not be fully understood by X if X fails to recognize 
that Z is being labelled as the decrepit one by Y. Grice (1989) was the first to 
provide an elucidation of how a speaker can communicate more than what his 
words explicitly say. Since Strawson does cite Grice, it is safe to assume that he 
has in mind the same kind of systematic Gricean principles underlying prag-
matic implication (Lindblom 2001).
2.4 An inequality
With the preceding three equations at hand, we can write the mock inequality
 sense-A-meaning ≤ sense-B-meaning ≤ sense-C-meaning,
where progressively richer senses of meaning are obtained by moving from left 
to right in the inequality. Since X employs (in proceeding from S to sense-A, 
sense-A to sense-B, and sense-B to sense-C) A-knowledge, B-knowledge, and 






























C-knowledge, respectively, the progression in meaning will in general be addi-
tive. However, sometimes the move from one sense to another is really no move 
at all. A fitting example comes from mathematics: let S be a sentence expressing 
a proposition of arithmetic, e.g., “There is always a prime number greater than 
a given natural number”. In this case, the move from sense-A to sense-B is no 
move at all because the statement S expresses an analytic truth.
What about C-knowledge? Can its contribution also be null sometimes?4 
The answer is not in the affirmative, despite what Strawson thinks. To see this, 
take an explicitly performative statement such as “I order you to drop that gun”. 
With Strawson, we may, at first, be inclined to accept that knowledge of the 
force of this S can be taken to belong to the sense-A-meaning. However, this is 
not really to follow Austin (1976). To give an example, if a mutinous private in 
the British army purported to order his sergeant to drop his gun and the cow-
ardly sergeant did so, then a court martial would definitely rule that there was 
no order (or nothing with the force of an order), because a private cannot give 
an order to a sergeant. In other words, it is one thing for a type to be meant to 
be tokened in an act with a certain force and another thing for the token actu-
ally to realize an act with that force.
2.5 Leech’s Scheme
Another threefold distinction due to Leech is worth indicating at this point. 
Leech states that specification of context has the effect of narrowing down the 
communicative possibilities of a message. He says that in particularizing mean-
ing, context helps in the following ways (Leech 1981: 67):
(A)  Context eliminates certain ambiguities or multiple meanings in the mes-
sage (e.g., lets us know that page in a given instance means a boy atten-
dant rather than a piece of paper).
(B)  Context indicates the referents of certain types of word we call deictic 
(this, that, here, there, now, then, etc.), and of other expressions of definite 
meaning such as John, I, you, he, it, the man.
(C)  Context supplies information which the speaker/writer has omitted 
through ellipsis (e.g., we are able to appreciate that Janet! Donkeys! means 
something like ‘Janet! Drive those donkeys away!’ rather than ‘Janet! 
Bring those donkeys here!’, or any other of the indefinitely many theoreti-
cal possibilities).
Clearly, (A) states the so-called disambiguating role of context and immediately 
brings to mind Strawson’s sense-A-meaning. Likewise, (B) is along the lines of 
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Strawson’s sense-B-meaning. Finally, although the singling out of ellipsis might 
at first sight seem excessively specific, it is clear that Leech is talking in (C) 
about a particular way of how speaker’s intention is to be inferred. His example 
has the same import as Strawson’s sense-C-meaning, viz. the requirement that 
the reader must be aware of all that was intended by the speaker. “Janet! Don-
keys!” is recurrently used by aunt Betsey Trotwood in David Copperfield; it 
is an order to her maid to carry out the routine task of driving donkeys off 
the grass.
Thus, context is seen to have a disambiguating function (among others). 
Consider the following conversation:
X (a woman, talking to Y): “I am an investigator”.
Y (talking to Z and referring to X): “She is an investigator”.
Z (talking to X): “So, you are an investigator”.
In this segment, the word ‘investigator’ has context-dependent meaning. The 
common ground of X, Y, and Z is used to select an appropriate meaning for this 
word. Similarly, the indexicals (‘I’ or ‘she’ or ‘you’) can be bound to the appro-
priate person (viz. X) only by the help of context. For example, the sentences 
uttered by X and Y have the same propositional content, and this we can say 
using some circumstantial information and conventions about discourse. To 
quote Recanati (1993: 235):
[T]he meaning of a word like ‘I’ is a function that takes us from a context of 
utterance to the semantic value of the word in that context, which semantic 
value (the reference of ‘I’) is what the word contributes to the proposition 
expressed by the utterance.
3. Dependence on context
Having defined the three senses of meaning, A-, B-, and C-, Strawson turns to 
the following question: What specific differences are there in the ways in which 
the meaning of ‘what is said’ depends on context in the three cases? In particu-
lar, in which cases and to what degree can this dependence be itself represented 
as governed by linguistic rule or convention?
Obviously, context bears on the determination of sense-A-meaning in just 
those situations where S suffers from syntactic and/or lexical ambiguity. How-
ever, disambiguation of S by context at this level is not in general a matter of 
linguistic rule or convention. Rather, it is a matter of general relevance; see the 
earlier Perry’s ‘bank’ example, above. In the same vein, Leech (1981: 69) states 






























that it is relevant to the interpretation of “Shall I put the sweater on?” to know 
whether sweaters heated by electric power are on the market. This shows, in a 
rather strong sense, that the study of interpretation-in-context is closely tied to 
encyclopaedic knowledge about the world.
Context bears on the determination of sense-B-meaning in all cases except 
those where B-knowledge adds nothing to A-knowledge. And surely there are 
some semantic rules of natural language moderating such contextual depen-
dence. Here’s what Perry says about indexicals (Perry 1997: 597–598):
There is an intimate connection between the meanings of “I” and “the person 
who utters this token”, even if it falls short of synonymy. The second phrase 
does not have the meaning of “I”, but it gives part of the meaning of “I”. It sup-
plies the condition of designation that English associates with “I”. […] Here 
are the conditions of designation for some familiar indexicals […]:
I: u [an utterance of “I”] designates x iff x is the speaker of u
you: u [an utterance of “you”] designates y iff ∃x(x is the speaker of u & x ad-
dresses y with u)
now: u [an utterance of “now”] designates t iff ∃x(x is the speaker of u & x 
directs u at t during part of t)
that ϕ: u [an utterance of “that ϕ”] designates y iff ∃x(x is the speaker of u & 
x directs u towards y)
It is noted, however, that B-knowledge is not wholly under the governance of 
language rules (cf. Perry’s caveat: “… part of the meaning…”). For instance, 
with the demonstrative “here” there arises the question of how large a region 
to consider: “It is always very hot here at this time of the day”. (In this room or 
in this town?)
Likewise, an utterance of “We must sell those HAL stocks now!” would 
signify different time points when it is made by a portfolio manager sitting at 
his on-line terminal (“now”: in a couple of seconds) and by an executive during 
a luncheon with his assistants (“now”: this afternoon).
4. Amendments
Strawson enumerated several points at which his threefold distinction is too 
crude to provide for all the complexities of language use. Despite the title of 
this section, he did not always suggest these as amendments to his scheme; 
sometimes he was content with just jotting them down.
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4. Semantic creativity
According to the inequality given earlier, some sense-A-meaning is always in-
cluded in the complete meaning of ‘what is said’. This is due to the nature of 
construction of sense-C-meaning. However, isn’t it unrealistic to suppose that 
all meanings of a particular word are listed priorly in X’s ideal lexicon? Con-
sider the interpretation of a morphologically complex word w. Word formation 
rules might constrain but do not fully determine the interpretation of w. To put 
it mildly, the linguistically specified meaning of w may and frequently does go 
beyond what is available from its compositional subparts (Chierchia and Mc-
Connell-Ginet 1990: 366–370).
Aitchison (1997: 16–17), for example, remarks that newspapers can popu-
larize new words. Two recent examples are yomp and wimp. Yomp (to march 
with heavy equipment over difficult terrain) was a military term used fre-
quently during the Falklands War. Wimp (an ineffectual person) originated in 
the U.S.; just remember a generic White House correspondent during the Gulf 
War: “President Bush has finally shaken off his wimp image”.
Recanati uses the term contextual sense construction to refer to the general 
problem. He notes that sometimes the conventional sense of the subparts of a 
complex phrase and the way they are syntactically brought together is insuf-
ficient to evaluate the semantic value of the complex phrase. His examples are 
particularly forceful (Recanati 1994: 343):
Thus ‘he finished the book’ can mean that he finished reading the book, writ-
ing it, binding it, tearing it into pieces, burning it, and so forth […]; ‘finger cup’ 
will mean either ‘cup having the shape of a finger’ or ‘cup containing a finger 
of whisky’ or ‘cup which one holds with one finger’, or whatever […]; ‘John’s 
book’ can mean ‘the book that John owns, wrote, gave, received’, or whatever 
[…]. In all such cases there is not a ‘selection’ from a limited range of preexist-
ing interpretations for the complex phrase. Rather, an indefinite number of 
possible interpretations can be constructed in a creative manner. [our italics]
Strawson finds his scheme too simple when it comes to semantic creativity. 
A compromise can be made by allowing X’s ideal dictionary be updated by 
adding the new (extended) meaning of a new word. However, he sees this as a 
sacrifice of his ground rules: when we do this, we make X’s dictionary follow 
his understanding rather than his understanding obey his dictionary.































Let us return to a crucial proviso in the original formulation — that S be seri-
ously uttered. Seriousness and sincerity are closely related. Austin believes that 
for certain speech acts to be performed sincerely, a speaker must have the right 
thoughts or feelings; similarly, Searle thinks that for certain insincere speech 
acts a speaker pretends to have intentions or beliefs that she does not have 
(Mann and Kreutel 2004). This implies that an ironical utterance of S may be 
regarded as non-serious. However, ironical utterances make up quite a large 
crowd and cannot be so easily dismissed as aberrations.
The essential problem posed by ironical utterances is that a declarative sen-
tence uttered ironically may express an idea that contradicts the idea that it 
professes to express. Consider saying “Oh, you are always so tidy!” to a janitor 
and meaning that he has made a mess again. Or imagine related variants like 
understatements, e.g., saying “It was rather concise” and meaning that it (say, a 
televised speech by the president) was extremely terse.
As Strawson (1997b: 222) notes, in these cases “we cannot say that the 
C-meaning includes and adds to the B-meaning, but only that the C-meaning 
contradicts the apparent B-meaning”. Figurative uses pose a similar problem. 
Harris (1996: 112) says:
If I say “Miller pulls off these tricks with string and sealing wax, false bottoms 
and sleight of hand”, the statement will not be taken as figurative if I’m refer-
ring to an amateur magician, though it will be if the context makes it clear that 
I am referring to J.H. Miller the critical theorist.
4.3 Reference
Reference has always been a grand issue in studies of context in the philosophy 
of language, and it is only normal that Strawson notes that sometimes a given S 
admits different interpretations where in one interpretation a certain constitu-
ent of S (e.g., a definite description) has a referential use whereas in some other 
interpretation it doesn’t (Donnellan 1966; Kripke 1977). Let S be “The next 
parliamentary elections will resolve the matter.’ The descriptive phrase may be 
used to refer to a definite event (say, the elections scheduled to June 8, 2004) 
or S may be used with the intention of saying “Whensoever the parliamentary 
elections are carried out, the matter will be resolved’.
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4.4 Translation proper
An Italian saying, “Traduttore, traditore” (The translator is a betrayer), hints at 
the potential problems one can encounter in acquiring sense-A-meaning.
In an essay on translation, Jakobson (1992) distinguishes three ways of in-
terpreting a verbal sign. Intralingual translation (rewording) interprets verbal 
signs by means of other signs of the same language. Interlingual translation 
(translation proper) interprets verbal signs by means of some other language. 
Finally, intersemiotic translation (transmutation) interprets verbal signs by 
means of signs of nonverbal sign systems. In order to demonstrate the difficulty 
of translation proper, he gives an example from Russian (Jakobson 1992: 148):
In order to translate accurately the English sentence “I hired a worker”, a Rus-
sian needs supplementary information, whether this action was completed or 
not and whether the worker was a man or woman, because he must make his 
choice between a verb of completive or noncompletive aspect […] and be-
tween a masculine and feminine noun […]. If I ask the utterer of the English 
sentence whether the worker was male or female, my question may be judged 
irrelevant or indiscreet, whereas in the Russian version of this sentence an 
answer to this question is obligatory. On the other hand, whatever the choice 
of Russian grammatical forms to translate the quoted English message, the 
translation will give no answer to the question of whether I “hired” or “have 
hired” the worker, or whether he/she was an indefinite or definite worker (“a” 
or “the”).
4.5 Relevance
Sperber and Wilson (1986) take relevance to be the psychological pertinence 
of a proposition to a context. The assumption is that people have intuitions of 
relevance, viz. they can consistently distinguish relevant from irrelevant in-
formation. However, these intuitions are not easy to elicit or use as evidence. 
Moreover, intuitions of relevance are relative to contexts, and there is no way 
of controlling exactly which context someone has in mind at a given moment. 
Despite these difficulties, Sperber and Wilson invoke intuitions of relevance. 
According to them, a proposition is relevant to a context if it interacts in a cer-
tain way with the (context’s) existing assumptions about the world, i.e., if it has 
some contextual effects. These contextual effects include:
– Contextual implication: A new assumption can be used together with the 
existing rules in the context to generate new assumptions;






























– Strengthening: A new assumption can strengthen some of the existing as-
sumptions;
– Contradicting or eliminating: A new assumption may change or eliminate 
some of the existing assumptions of the context.
Sperber and Wilson talk about degrees of relevance. Clearly, one piece of in-
formation may be more relevant to a particular context than to another. To 
compare the relevance of pieces of information, they consider the mental pro-
cessing effort, e.g., the length of the chain of reasoning and the amount of en-
cyclopaedic information involved, and so on. Finally, they propose a celebrated 
maxim (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 125), which we can summarize as follows:
The Relevance Maxim: An assumption is relevant in a context to the extent 
that its contextual effects in this context are large. Conversely, an assumption 
is irrelevant in a context to the extent that the effort required to process it in 
this context is large.
The measurement of contextual effects and processing effort is a difficult task 
due to the problems of qualification of mental effects and effort, Sperber and 
Wilson warn (1986: 130):
The problems involved in measuring contextual effects and processing effort 
are, of course, by no means specific to relevance theory or to pragmatics. They 
affect psychology as a whole. However, for relevance theory these problems take 
on a more specific form. Within relevance theory, the problem is not so much to 
assess contextual effects and processing effort from the outside, but to describe 
how the mind assesses it own achievements and efforts from the inside, and 
decides as a result to pursue its efforts or relocate them in different directions.
5. Further points
The following are not so much weaknesses of Strawson’s scheme as possible 
avenues of research for streamlining it.
5. Radical interpretation and presemantic uses
Regarding sense-A-meaning, the following singularity needs to be noticed: If 
his A-knowledge is null then X cannot even set himself to the study the ques-
tion properly. This remark should not be taken as an avowal of the impossibility 
of radical interpretation. When X is a radical interpreter who must interpret L 
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from scratch, he must do so in the absence of any antecedent understanding of 
L, and only using evidence that is plausibly available to him (Davidson 1984).
That this is difficult, on the other hand, is something even Davidson him-
self accepts to a large extent (Kent 1993):
It would beg the question, in trying to study the nature of interpretation, to as-
sume that you know in advance what a person’s intentions, beliefs, and desires 
are. […] There is no master key or framework theory that you can have prior 
to a communicative interaction or situation.
Sometimes context is used to figure out which language is being spoken. Con-
sider a well-known example due to Perry (2000: 314):
Ich! (said by several teenagers at camp in response to the question, “Who 
would like some sauerkraut?”)
Perry says that knowing that this took place in a German rather than an Amer-
ican camp might help one to see that it was made by eager German teenagers 
rather than American teenagers repelled by the very idea. In this case, context 
(or rather its presemantic use) is pertinent to figuring out which language is 
being used.
5.2 Contextual domains and subjective adjectives
A discussion given by Recanati (1998) refers to the fact that natural language 
quantifiers often seem implicitly restricted. When S is the sentence “The presi-
dent shook hands with everyone”, X is inclined to think that “everyone” must 
range over the domain of people who attended the press conference or the 
reception or the fund-raising dinner or whatever — not everyone in the whole 
world. Along similar lines, when Y utters “Most beggars attended the bash” he 
is likely to allude to a particular group of beggars (say, those in his neighbour-
hood); it is from this group that many joined the festivities.
In dealing with subjective (relative) adjectives such as “large”, the context 
contributes to meaning in a decisive way. Consider this (Chierchia and McCo-
nnell-Ginet 1990: 374): “Lee built a large snowman”. If Lee is a toddler playing 
in the backyard of his house, the snowman is probably at most as big as Lee 
himself. On the other hand, if Lee is a teenager competing in a snow carnival, 
the snowman is probably much bigger than Lee.
One way of dealing with the context-dependent nature of relative adjectives 
is to assume that the context provides us with a set of comparison classes. Still, 
with sentences like “A large tadpole is not a large animal”, the problem remains 






























unresolved. In the same context, different comparison classes are needed for 
the first and second occurrences of the adjective.
5.3 Context renewal
Consider an on-going conversation between X and Y. Y utters S, X in return 
utters S′, Y in return utters S″, and so on and so forth. In order to understand 
say, S″, X would need to use the previous discourse, or the meaning of ‘what 
was said earlier’. That an interactional context is continually being developed 
with each successive utterance is an observation Heritage (1984) has made in 
his work on ethnomethodology. According to him, utterances and the social 
actions they embody are treated as doubly contextual. First, utterances and 
actions are context-shaped. This means that their contributions cannot be ad-
equately appreciated unless the context in which they operate is taken into ac-
count. Second, utterances and actions are context-renewing. Every utterance 
will form the subsequent context for some following action in a sequence; it 
will thus contribute to the contextual framework that lets one understand the 
next action. Additionally, each action will function to renew context, where re-
newal is understood as one or more of the processes of maintaining, adjusting, 
altering, and so on. In the remainder of this section, we look at contributions 
similar in nature to Heritage’s. Our general point is that at the level of sense-C-
meaning Strawson’s scheme would benefit from enhancements of sociocultural 
nature.5
5.4 Communicative competence
Gumperz (1997: 40–41) regards communicative competence as “the knowl-
edge of linguistic and related communicative conventions that speakers must 
have to initiate and sustain conversational involvement”. This requires knowl-
edge of social and cultural rules of a language — in addition to a knowledge of 
grammatical — and preferably addresses the competences of actual speakers, 
not an idealized standard. In (Gumperz 1992), he introduces what is known 
as a contextualization cue. He confirms that a given aspect of linguistic behav-
iour (e.g. lexical, prosodic, phonological, etc.) can function as a cue, indicating 
those aspects of context that are to be taken into account to interpret what is 
said by a speaker. Contextualization cues hint at relevant aspects of the so-
cial context (via particular codes, styles, and dialects), thus enabling partici-
pants in a discourse to reason about their respective communicative intentions 
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and purposes. He also notes that because of its cultural base, the meaning of 
a conversation is frequently different for different participants if they are not 
members of the same speech community. In (Gumperz 1993), he offers a case 
study of how a difference in the use of contextualization cues between a native 
speaker of English and a non-native yet fluent speaker of English causes a seri-
ous breakdown in communication.
Another example of a cross-cultural communicative event is the following 
exchange in a kindergarten on a reservation (Saville-Troike 1989: 131–132):
A Navajo man opened the door to the classroom and stood silently, looking 
at the floor. The Anglo-American teacher said ‘Good morning’ and waited 
expectantly but the man did not respond. The teacher then said ‘My name is 
Mrs. Jones,’ and again waited for a response. There was none.
The whole exchange is more enlightening but this brief excerpt illustrates our 
point. The man’s silence is appropriate from a Navajo perspective; it shows re-
spect. What is more, a religious Navajo taboo prohibits individuals from saying 
their own name. Mrs. Jones’s expectation is also reasonable from an Anglo-
American perspective; the man must have returned her greeting, identified 
himself, and stated his reason for being there. It turns out that he was there to 
take his son, Billy, and that Billy is more accustomed to the Anglo-American 
ways than his stoic father is: as he walks towards his father, he waves at Mrs. 
Jones and says ‘Bye-bye’.
6. Conclusion
The originator of a message usually assumes quite a bit of background knowl-
edge on the part of an addressee (Leech 1981: 66). The task of the addressee is 
to narrow down the list of meanings available to him and attain the intended 
meaning. Originally, the message may be replete with several potential mean-
ings. By enveloping it in increasingly narrower contexts, the number of mean-
ings is reduced (Dascal 2004a). Eventually, it is hoped that just one meaning is 
isolated as the meaning of the message.6
This paper argued that there is a certain persuasive approach to study-
ing the feasibility of this problem, first spelled out in “Austin and ‘locutionary 
meaning’” and later taken up in detail in “Meaning and context,” two early 
papers by Strawson. The approach is both simple and elegant, and we believe 
that future studies to formalize context (Akman and Surav 1996, 1997) might 
profit from its formulaic nature.7































* An earlier and shorter version of this paper was presented in CONTEXT’99 (Akman and 
Alpaslan 1999) and benefited from the perceptive remarks of the anonymous referees of that 
conference. Some of their comments are utilized verbatim in a couple of places in this paper. 
Insightful remarks of the anonymous referees of Pragmatics & Cognition have also been 
very helpful. As for our reconstruction of Strawson’s ideas, we hope that our interpretation 
and (partial) reworking of his work is accurate. However, as Johnson-Laird (1990: 9) rightly 
cautions: “[T]here is no end to the process of recovering speakers’ intentions — why they 
chose to communicate this or that information. And a text does not talk back, and hence as 
its author’s background assumptions fade into obscurity so its interpreters are free to project 
ever wider and ever more idiosyncratic readings into it”.
. Modern literary theory distinguishes between an author’s intended meaning and what-
ever significances a reader finds in the text. Not all patterns and relationships found by the 
reader in a text can be attributed to authorial intentions. The producer of a text, Eco (1984: 
7) claims, “has to foresee a model of the possible reader […] supposedly able to deal inter-
pretatively with the expressions in the same way as the author deals generatively with them”. 
This possible reader Eco calls the model reader. In order to make his text communicative, the 
author has to make sure that the totality of ‘codes’ upon which his work is built is the same 
as that shared by the model reader.
2. The original essays were published considerably earlier. Thus, Chapter 11, “Austin and 
‘locutionary meaning’”, first appeared in I. Berlin et al. (eds), 1973, Essays on J.L. Austin. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. A partial translation of Chapter 12, “Meaning and context,” 
appeared in 1970 in Langages 17, with the title “Phrase et acte de parole”.
3. An explanation regarding the motivations of the two essays is in order. Austin (1976) 
famously distinguished between the meaning and the force of an utterance. He associated 
the former with the ‘locutionary’ act performed in making the utterance, and the latter with 
the ‘illocutionary’ act. In his chapter on Austin, Strawson uses the threefold distinction to 
examine Austin’s work; his standpoint is that what Austin means by locutionary meaning is 
not very clear. On the other hand, in “Meaning and context” the threefold distinction itself is 
examined in detail. Our remarks will generally bear on the contents of this essay.
4. One may object to the preceding analysis by noting that there are naturally occurring 
contexts in which the particular S of this example might have a metaphorical meaning. At 
least, this is exactly what happens when one replaces S with a similar sentence, “He stood on 
his own feet since then”, meaning: He thought and acted independently since then. We agree 
and note that this is precisely the point of Strawson’s imposition, viz. S is uttered seriously. 
More on this later.
5. In which case the move from B to C might still be regarded as an addition, even if it is the 
minimal addition that there is nothing to be added to the B-meaning.
6. See Fetzer and Akman (2002) and Fetzer (2004) for recent work on social aspects of 
context.
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7. While this would definitely require another, full-fledged treatment elsewhere, it must be 
noted that via his ingenious construct grafting, Derrida has argued against this possibility. 
With this term he refers to the process of inserting an utterance onto a context that alters 
its functioning (or imagining a context in which an initially meaningless sentence would 
have meaning). For Derrida, context is infinitely expandable. And while meaning is con-
text-bound, context is boundless. Sympathizing with Derrida, Culler (1988:148) mentions 
a court case, Frigaliment vs. BNS International Sales Corp., where several witnesses were 
summoned to confirm what chicken meant in the chicken trade: a bird of any age or a young 
broiler, fryer, or roaster? The lawyers involved in the case knew that context is produced, 
and that since context is not saturable, a contextualization is never completed (Edmonds 
and Akman 2002).
8. One of the referees suggested that a hearer in a situation should consider, instead of the 
framework proposed in this paper, constructing a full model of what is going on and then 
alter it if it proves to be unhelpful in understanding/communicating. The model might in-
volve, it was suggested, all kinds of factors (lexical, deictic, contextual, etc.), although not 
necessarily structured in any specific way, as the present work (or rather, Strawson) suggests. 
We think that this is also a viable (and admittedly, rather different) approach. In any case, it 
is clear, as the referee observes, that the threefold Strawsonian scheme is not linear or uni-
directional, e.g., sense-B-meaning can influence sense-A-meaning. Now, does the presence 
of such interaction among senses prove that the scheme is totally undermined? We do not 
believe so, although we appreciate the caveat of the referee.
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